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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes a functional framework for developing strategic assessment 
at the Combatant Command level, specifically European Command.  The 
framework establishes a functional architecture based on derived requirements 
and objectives according to the systems engineering process described by 
Dennis Buede.  This thesis describes the current methodology for developing 
theater plans based on the national strategies established by the President, 
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In addition, it 
provides an analysis of the system stakeholders in order to define the purpose 
and utility of a strategic assessment from various perspectives.  Based on this 
analysis, the requirements and functions of the system are decomposed and 
arranged according to a hierarchy via Vitech’s CORE 8 University Edition.  
Finally, the developed model is tested against a notional scenario that assesses 
a fictional exercise according to the derived functional model, in order to 
demonstrate the methodology used to relate activities to strategic goals.  This 
thesis defines the framework for conducting strategic assessments and 
leveraging them to maximize the impact of U.S. activities. 
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In June 2011, U.S. European Command’s Assessment and Analysis Directorate 
made a presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School researchers where they 
expressed a desire to improve the strategic assessment process such that it was 
useable, feasible and repeatable.  Since assessments are based on individual 
reports, transform vast amounts of data into a strategic presentation and inform 
decisions and plans, the systems engineering process, as described by Dennis 
Buede, was required to determine system boundaries, interactions, requirements 
and functions to satisfy the goals expressed by the directorate. 
This thesis applied that process to develop a functional architecture to 
define a framework for strategic assessment.  This process began by identifying 
stakeholders of the assessment system, including developers, decision makers, 
and end product users.  From this list, a collection of individual needs was 
aggregated into an effective need that states the purpose of conducting strategic 
assessments.  The statement of need is to develop theater-level assessment 
capability for the purpose of evaluating current Phase 0/Steady State activities 
and operations to shape and modify future allocation of resources in order to 
support and advance the interests of the United States with respect to the 
European Theater. 
From this need a set of objectives and requirements was derived that 
provides measures of system satisfaction and the foundation for the functions 
performed by the system.  Six top-level functions describe the actions that when 
performed, will facilitate the achievement of the effective need.  The 
decomposition of these six functions, coupled with their arrangement into a 
functional process, defines the functional architecture for the system and 
establishes the structure for relating tactical activities to the strategic goals and 
desired end states. 
 xviii
A fictional military exercise is described in the European area of 
responsibility and is assessed against a notional set of goals at the theater, 
regional and country levels according to the functional model developed in this 
thesis.  The hypothetical assessment illustrates how the assessment links 
activities at the tactical level to the strategic goals and desired end states through 
a series of incremental steps corresponding to the planning levels of abstraction 
(i.e. strategic, operational and tactical).   
The functional architecture developed in this thesis provides traceability 
between the strategic and tactical levels of abstraction.  These linkages are not 
necessarily direct connections; rather the assessment establishes them through 
a series of smaller steps.  This method of relating tactical events to strategic end-
states permits the assessor to communicate via the strategic assessment that 
informs not only whether an action supports strategic goal, but also how the 
action supported the goal.  This understanding facilitates plan development that 
incorporates the assessment’s findings in order to enhance the Combatant 
Command’s ability to implement strategy. 
By clearly stating the assessment through a series of well-defined smaller 
linkages, decision makers gain a better understanding of a given activity’s impact 
on the AOR at various levels of abstraction.  They also can more accurately 
identify risks and impediments to achieving the American goals, by observing the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the execution of our acknowledged “very good, yet still imperfect” 
strategy we need a mechanism for making adjustments.  We need 
to be able to assess our performance and our effectiveness. 
—Admiral James G. Stavirdis 2010 
A. BACKGROUND 
As technological advancements reduce the time required to move people, 
goods, and services, while simultaneously allowing for nearly instantaneous 
communication between remote locations around the globe, the United States is 
a member of a highly integrated and alliance-focused global community that is 
capable of addressing current challenges (The White House 2010, ii).  In fact, the 
United States continues to take the lead in assuring freedom of movement and 
commerce throughout the world through its active international presence. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) divides the world into geographic 
regions under the command of senior military leadership in order to facilitate 
international ties in cooperation with other agencies, such as the U.S. 
Department of State (DoS) and the Ambassadors to given countries.  Figure 1 
illustrates how the U.S. DoD divides geographic responsibilities among the 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs). 
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Figure 1.   COCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) (From The White House 2011) 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in coordination with the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasks the COCOMs to develop a wide range of 
plans to define a range of activities including peace time training, conflict 
intervention, and construction (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a, II-6).  These 
plans describe what efforts the COCOMs will undertake in cooperation with other 
American agencies, Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs) and other countries 
in order to achieve the stated goals and end states.   
Strategic Assessments are the COCOM’s mechanism to evaluate and 
communicate the state of affairs in their AORs and describe the results of their 
efforts. Given the current national security threats and budgetary realities, the 
Pentagon is shifting financial and military resources away from Europe (Dreazen 
2012).  In the near future, it is likely that these assessments will also be used to 




The challenges of developing, evaluating, and implementing an effective 
assessment methodology is the essence of an ongoing NPS research effort.  
This thesis directly supports this research effort by utilizing a systems 
engineering approach to examine all aspects of the current Theater Campaign 
Plan (TCP), while addressing the many areas important to the development of 
U.S. national security interests in the theater.  Based on initial input from 
USEUCOM, of particular interest to the decision maker is to enable useful, 
feasible, and repeatable TCP assessments. But these three terms are ill-defined 
and the answers vary based on perspective. 
During a video teleconference (VTC) in June 2011, USEUCOM presented 
many of their current challenges with the assessment process.  The presentation 
described how the Assessment and Analysis Directorate (ECJ7) utilizes compiled 
data to assess USEUCOM’s TCP.  The entire plan is assessed annually, divided 
among four quarterly assessments (Assessment and Analysis Directorate [ECJ7] 
2011b, 9).   
The objective of this research is to analyze the inputs to the assessment 
process, the needs of those who use the TCP assessment, and the relationship 
between the investment of U.S. resources and the desired strategic outcomes.  
This study will be translated into objectives, requirements, and functions needed 
to satisfy the characteristics, useful, feasible, and repeatable, and construct a 
formal framework for developing and integrating strategic assessments into the 
process of constructing and implementing strategies among the COCOMs. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Under current guidance, the COCOMs are required to generate multiple 
assessments to different audiences (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a, D-7).  
COCOMs present two extensive and separate assessments to SECDEF and 
CJCS; the nature of the information contained in these assessments does not 
easily provide feedback on the TCP to USEUCOM, requiring an additional 
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assessment to inform the USEUCOM Commander (Kuenning 2011, 1).  Since 
the three consumers of the strategic assessment, SECDEF, CJCS and COCOM 
Commander, have distinct needs, the answers they need from an assessment 
will necessarily differ; however the assessment itself can be independent of its 
use and the development process can be improved to enhance efficiency.   
The complexity involved with developing the strategic assessments stems 
from numerous factors.  These factors include determining appropriate metrics to 
measure progress, the evaluation of current realities in the AOR against 
conducted operations, and preparation time for the assessment.  The 
administrative time requirements involve formatting and tailoring the assessment 
information for the different audiences, i.e., USEUCOM Commander, CJCS and 
SECDEF.  These complexities result in a large time demand that limits the 
effectiveness and utility of the assessment itself. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the critical functions that a strategic theater level assessment 
must perform to support decision makers? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
How are the terms “useful, feasible and repeatable” defined within the 
context of strategic assessment? 
How does the assessment process transform inputs into outputs? 
How does the assessment relate activities conducted in the AOR to 
strategic end states? 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
A fact-finding trip to USEUCOM’s Headquarters in September 2011 
garnered insight into the workings of ECJ7 to determine how to scope this 
research effort.  The ECJ7 is divided into two divisions: the Theater Division and 
the Operation Division (Assessment and Analysis Directorate [ECJ7] 2011b, 7).  
The Operation Division works with the ECJ3 to develop and assess current and 
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future operations; these tend to be less time intensive and do not attempt to 
assess how the operations affect the greater theater-level concerns.  The 
Theater Division works with ECJ5 to develop and assess future plans to be 
implemented in the AOR.  These plans also involve contingency plans to use at 
short notice.  ECJ7 conducts assessments on those plans, as well as other 
theater-wide plans implemented by commands that operate across COCOMs. 
Due to the robust and diverse nature of strategic assessments, this thesis 
limits consideration of strategic assessments to those that focus on Phase 
0/Steady State operations within USEUCOM’s AOR, specifically focusing on the 
interactions between the end states provided in the Guidance for the 
Employment of the Force (GEF), TCP, Regional Cooperation Plan (RCP) and 
Country Cooperation Plan (CCP). 
F. EFFECTIVE NEED 
Based on the problem definition and scoping of the problem, the effective 
need presented in USEUCOM’s assessment community is to: 
Develop theater-level assessment capability for the purpose of 
evaluating current Phase 0/Steady State activities and operations 
to shape and modify future allocation of resources in order to 
support and advance the interests of the United States with respect 
to the European Theater. 
G. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To satisfy the effective need, this thesis proposes the following solution: 
Develop an assessment process architecture that maps to the 
planning process architecture.  By utilizing objective evidence from 
the tactical level to inform the Measures of Performances (MOPs) 
of the CCP, a base assessment of how the CCPs support the RCP, 
which in turn supports the TCP and by extension the GEF Theater 
end states.  This structure provides the European Commander with 
the tools to determine where to employ resources and assets to 
achieve the desired end state and objectives. 
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H. METHODOLOGY 
This project utilized the systems engineering process described by Dennis 
Buede’s The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods (2009) to 
develop a functional architecture.  It produced a stakeholder analysis, objective 
hierarchy, list of requirements and functional analysis.  Together, these products 
describe what must occur to relate tactical-level information to theater-level end 
states and goals.   
I. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the COCOM’s current structure and how it develops 
theater-level assessments.  Chapter III explains the research methodology, 
stakeholder analysis, objective hierarchy and list of requirements.  Chapter IV 
describes the development of the functional architecture.  Chapter V applies a 
notional scenario to the model to demonstrate its effectiveness.  Chapter VI 
presents conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
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II. COMBATANT COMMANDER’S ROLE IN  
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
More than any point in human history—the interests of nations and 
people are shared. 
—President Barack Obama,  
UN General Assembly,  
September 22, 2009 
A. PLANNING GUIDANCE 
1. National Security Strategy 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the document that outlines the 
President’s view of the strategic environment and the approach to affect change 
on that environment (The White House 2010, i).  President Obama described this 
as the difference between the “world as it is” and the “world we seek” (The White 
House 2010, 7, 9).  The most recent NSS stresses the need to work with the 
international order to address global challenges, stating that “the starting point for 
that collective action will be our engagement with other countries” (The White 
House 2010, 3).  The NSS does not specifically dictate to the DoD what 
objectives it must achieve, but rather provides the context for their focus.  The 
SECDEF defines these objectives in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
2. Quadrennial Defense Review 
The QDR builds off the President’s view of national security and defines 
the DoD’s strategy to satisfy challenges the NSS describes.  It provides military 
planners with initiatives that their plans must address: congruent with the global 
point of view of the NSS, the 2010 QDR restates the need to cooperate with 
allies to increase global security.  The key initiatives from that document relating 
to building security capacity of partner states are: 
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 Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities 
for security force assistance 
 Enhance linguistic, regional and cultural ability 
 Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation 
forces 
 Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training 
 Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical 
capabilities to partner forces (Department of Defense. 2010) 
The JCS utilizes the QDR and NSS to develop the method that the military will 
use to advance national interests and communicate that in the National Military 
Strategy (NMS).  
3. National Military Strategy 
The NMS provide military leaders with the JCS’s vision for the utilization of 
the Joint Force.  The 2011 NMS promotes three encompassing themes: 
 Joint Forces’ leadership approach is as important as the military 
capabilities 
 The security environment is constantly changing, and it requires the 
Joint Force to foster relationships with allies to develop security 
partnerships 
 The Joint Force must prepare for a dynamic and uncertain future 
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b) 
The combination of the strategies put forth in the NSS, QDR, and NMS 
result in the GEF. 
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4. Guidance for the Employment of the Forces 
The GEF describes the strategic and functional end states that COCOMs’ 
plans will support when executed.  The document consolidates five distinct 
guidance documents and then feeds in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
(JSCP), as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   GEF Guidance Consolidation (From Nix 2012, 17) 
The GEF also directs COCOMs to develop campaign plans to meet the 
theater and functional end states described within the document.  To assist the 
combatant commanders in supporting the national strategy, the document 
provides them with the following (Sweeny 2009, 2): 
Strategic end states for campaign planning 
Strategic assumptions 
Prioritized contingency planning scenarios and end states 
Global posture and global force management guidance 
Security cooperation priorities 
Overarching DoD and U.S. nuclear policy 
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The GEF divides combatant commanders into two categories: functional 
and geographic (FCC and GCC, respectively).  Figure 3 specifically identifies the 
commanders addressed in the GEF. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders  
(From Nix 2012, 23) 
5. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
Whereas the GEF defines what combatant commanders must do, the 
JSCP provides guidance on how to plan for the prescribed end states (Sweeny 
2009, 4).  The JSCP is the CJCS’s opportunity to communicate with the GCC, 
and formalizes their involvement into the planning process.  This document 
connects the strategic-level guidance and the planning activities and provides 
commanders with a list of available forces and capabilities to complete their 
mission (National Defense University, 2000, 4-20). 
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B. USEUCOM PLANNING PROCESS OVERVIEW 
1. Theater Campaign Plan 
Based on the guidance and strategies of the previously described 
documents, and the priorities of the COCOM Commander, the planning 
directorate (ECJ5) generates a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that includes 
Theater Security Cooperation, Phase 0, and contingency plans for the entire 
AOR, fully illustrated in Figure 4.  The TCP also incorporates plans from the 
FCCs, as their efforts occur around the globe. 
 
 
Figure 4.   COCOM Operational Plan Phases  
(From U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b, III-39) 
  
Region of Thesis’ Focus 
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The purpose of the USEUCOM’s TCP is to: 
 Direct the headquarters’ staff, components and Special Operations 
Command, Europe (SOCEUR) with specific tasks and guidance 
that will contribute to accomplishing the theater objectives in 
relationship to the theater priorities 
 Inform SECDEF and Joint Planning and Execution Community of 
the commander’s strategy to accomplish strategic goals, objectives 
and end states 
 Establish a common picture of the strategic security environment 
 Operationalize the commander’s vision, mission, theater objectives 
and theater priorities 
 Establish a framework to integrate, coordinate and synchronize 
steady state activities 
 Link strategic guidance to events and activities (Assessment and 
Analysis Directorate [ECJ7] 2011a, 3) 
A matrix is developed in accordance with the derivation of strategic-
theater level objectives, the objectives are across the horizontal axis and the 
Lines of Effort (LOEs), developed from the commander’s priorities are located on 
the vertical axis.  The intersection of the rows and columns becomes the Specific 
Lines of Efforts (SLOEs).   
Next, planners assign countries to applicable SLOEs and the completed 
matrix becomes the RCP.  Table 1 illustrates a notional matrix prior to assigning 
countries with SLOEs. 
 
Table 1.   Notional RCP Planning Matrix 
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The plans are further refined down to the country level by locating all of 
the SLOEs for a given country.  Finally, COCOM planners assign a standardized 
Line of Activity (LOA) for every LOE (Assessment and Analysis Directorate 
[ECJ7] 2011a, 19) and this collection of SLOEs and LOAs for the given country 
becomes the CCP.  Component commanders develop missions from these plans 
and provide them to tactical commanders for execution. 
2. Planning Process Architecture 
The previous section described the series of publications that build upon 
each other in order to achieve the U.S. leadership’s vision. The necessary plans 
evolve from general strategies; as the level abstraction progresses down from 
the strategic to the tactical, the scope narrows and the specifics increase.  





Figure 5.   Planning Process Architecture 
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C. USEUCOM PHASE 0 ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW 
ECJ7 works with the Policy, Strategy, Partnering, and Capabilities 
Directorate (ECJ5) to develop the strategic assessments that result from 
examining the LOAs and their associated MOEs and MOPs.  Figure 6 illustrates 
the current assessment process and the collaboration between the two 
directorates.  The input into the described assessment process is LOA 
assessment reports, often obtained via the Theater Security Cooperation 
Management Information System (TCSMIS).  These reports utilize feedback from 
the tactical commanders on the mission via classified networks.  In some 
instances, these reports do not fully capture the breadth of information needed 
for a complete assessment. To compensate for this occurrence, assessors 
include information from both classified and unclassified sources to obtain a 
more complete understanding of events and their effects. 
 
Figure 6.   ECJ5-ECJ7 Notional Assessment Process (From Assessment and 
Analysis Directorate [ECJ7] 2011b, 11) 
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ECJ7 conducts quarterly progress reports to develop a cumulative annual 
plans-based, bottom-up assessment (Assessment and Analysis Directorate 
[ECJ7] 2012b 9).  The quarterly reports are generated from the LOA progress 
reports, identify hindrances, obstacles and shortfalls, and identify the status of 
the outcomes or tasks. 
ECJ7’s goal for these assessments is to inform senior leadership such as 
SECDEF, CJCS, the USEUCOM Commander, and Component Commanders 
(Kuenning 2011, 1).  Each of these leaders has different needs and expectations, 
complicating the Directorate’s ability to use a repeatable process that results in 
products that are useful and feasible. Due to the ambiguous nature of the 
linkages between efforts and outcomes, and the diversity of the stakeholder’s 
needs, Dennis Buede’s systems engineering approach described in Chapter III, 
is used to develop a functional architecture that establishes the foundation for 
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III. DEFINING THE DESIGN PROBLEM 
Defining the design problem in systems engineering is one of 
several keys to success and can be approached systematically 
using engineering techniques. 
—Dennis M. Buede (2009, ix) 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The systems engineering process described by Buede facilitated the 
creation of a system capable of assessing USEUCOM’s AOR during the 
implementation of the phase 0/steady state plans.  The Engineering Design of 
Systems identifies five functions for system design (2009, 39): 
1. Define the Design Problem 
2. Develop Functional Architecture 
3. Design Physical Architecture 
4. Develop Allocated Architecture 
5. Obtain Approval and Document 
The first function establishes the boundaries for the system, and determines the 
objectives and requirements based on the needs of the system’s stakeholders.   
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT  
1. Definition 
Buede defines the operational concept as “a vision for what the system is 
(in general terms), a statement of mission requirements, and a description of how 
the system will be used” (2009, 67). 
Recall the effective need stated earlier in this thesis: 
Develop theater-level assessment capability for the purpose of 
evaluating current Phase 0/Steady State activities and operations 
to shape and modify future allocation of resources in order to 
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support and advance the interests of the United States with respect 
to the European Theater. 
Thus, the Strategic Assessment system will receive qualitative and quantitative 
data detailing the events of a mission, including those still in progress and those 
completed. Additionally, it applies the assessment process, compare the effects 
to those described in the plan, and relates outputs to the outcomes. Figure 7 
provides a graphical representation of this process. 
 
Figure 7.   Representation of Proposed Strategic Assessment System 
2. System Boundaries 
The ECJ7 Directorate will utilize the assessment system to satisfy  
appropriate stakeholders. A collection database stores much of the source 
information considered to be within the system boundary. The basis for the 
placement of the boundary is that the entities are fixed and unalterable; no 
reorganizing occurs in the military organizations. Such a reorganization is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, and for the purposes of this analysis is considered a 
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constraint.  Figure 8 describes the interactions between the proposed system 
and those outside the boundary.  
 
 
Figure 8.   OV-2: External System Interaction 
3. System Interactions 
Need lines describe the interactions between the proposed system and 
the external systems; each interaction describes what is inputted into the system 
or taken from the system as an output.  The transformation of the inputs into the 
outputs facilitates the desired outcomes described in the effective need. 
a. Office of the Secretary of Defense 
The OSD, under the direction of the SECDEF, defines the Theater 
End States.  When distributed to USEUCOM, these end states serve as the 
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foundation for the TCP objectives.  ECJ7 provides OSD with a strategic 
assessment that assists the USEUCOM Commander in the understanding of the 
strategic environment present in EUCOMS’s AOR, by describing the linkage 
between activities conducted and realities within the countries, regions, and 
which are present theater-wide. 
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The JCS does not directly affect the theater end states. However 
through the NMS, the JCS influences the USEUCOM Commander’s theater 
objectives.  Similar to OSD, JCS receives a separate assessment that addresses 
questions that the CJCS requires to function in an advisory role to the President. 
c. Combatant Commander 
The Combatant Commander is the hub through which the systems 
interact.  The commander receives guidance and end states from OSD and JCS, 
while providing direction to their staff via the Commander’s priorities and 
approves the RCP and CCP from ECJ5.  The complete theater plan is the metric 
that ECJ7 uses in the assessment process. 
The Combatant Commander reviews the strategic assessments 
from the ECJ7 prior to OSD and JCS.  They also use the assessment to increase 
their understanding of their AOR, in order to improve the effectiveness of their 
plans. 
d. ECJ5 
This directorate generates the Phase 0/steady state plans for 
USEUCOM and defines the standard LOAs used by the component commands.  
They also provide ECJ7 with the plans to assess.  They receive the assessment 
of the generated plans; the assessment provides lessons learned that improve 
the next iteration of theater plans. 
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e. Tactical Commanders 
Tactical Commanders implement the designed plans and provide a 
description of the mission to ECJ7, via LOA reports.  The commanders do not 
directly communicate with ECJ7. Rather, they submit their report to TCSMIS, 
accessed by ECJ7. 
f. External Sources of Information (Classified or Unclassified) 
These sources of information provide context and additional 
information to support the assessment development.  This is a passive 
interaction; ECJ7 seeks out the required information when necessary. 
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
According to Buede, stakeholders are organizations and individuals who 
define the objectives for the system.  Prior to defining the objectives, one must 
identify the stakeholders and determine their needs.  The level of interaction with 
the system will alter the stakeholder’s perspective and desires.  This analysis 
classifies the stakeholders into four classes with relation to the assessment 
system.  The first are decision makers, this class uses the assessment to inform 
decisions about future strategies, such as SECDEF.  The second class is system 
users, these are the stakeholders that implement the system, and example of this 
class is ECJ7.  The third class of stakeholder is system product users, these 
groups or individuals use the assessment as inputs into their respective system, 
ECJ5 is an stakeholder in this class.  The final class is referred to as “other,” thes 
stakeholders do not share a unifying characteristic but still interact with the 
system and are invested in the success of the assessment process, the 
Ambassador to a given country would be in this class. 
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A list of questions considered for the stakeholders follows (in no particular 
order): 
 What must a strategic assessment accomplish to be considered 
“useful”? 
 What attributes must a strategic assessment possess to be 
considered “feasible”? 
 What are types of input sources used to generate a strategic 
assessment? 
 Who collects the data? 
 What is the review process for the strategic assessment? 
 What is the appropriate distribution for the strategic assessment? 
 How long is a strategic assessment valid? 
 How should the information be presented to decision makers (i.e., 
statistics-focused or conclusion-focused)? 
 How can the assessment process be improved with each iteration? 
 How does the strategic assessment affect the planning process? 
 How does the strategic assessment influence resource allocation? 
1. Decision Makers 
Below is a list of stakeholders characterized as decision makers: 
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 Secretary of Defense 
 Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 USEUCOM Commander 
 ECJ7 Director 
 ECJ5 Director 
These stakeholders use the output of the assessment process to shape policy to 
reach the desired strategic end states and goals.  Direct solicitation of this group 
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was not possible, so an interview with Mr. Mark Bellchambers from Noetic Group 
occurred on December 1, 2011. His work involves improving the strategic 
assessment abilities for all of the COCOMS, via consultation with COCOMs and 
OSD.  His knowledge in this study allows him to be considered a subject matter 
expert (SME) on the current assessments processes.  The interview avoided his 
opinions on what should occur, but focused on what is currently happening.  His 
insight into the desires of senior leadership with respect to strategic assessment 
provided key information in understanding this group of stakeholders. 
Based on the interview, SECDEF is looking for COCOMs to be sufficiently 
versed in what efforts occurred and those still in progress within their AOR, in 
addition to how those efforts are affecting the AOR.  This desire implies that 
simply providing a graphical display or a “dashboard” of the assessments 
findings is insufficient. 
This aversion to dashboards is not necessarily constant between different 
administrations, so products of the system must be detailed enough to inform 
decision makers about the status of the AOR, but flexible enough to vary 
presentation style to fit a given preference.  To facilitate this flexibility, the 
assessment should identify the current status of an AOR at the strategic level, an 
analysis of trends and a discussion of other driving factors. 
2. System Users 
There is only one anticipated user of the system—the ECJ7 Strategic 
Assessment Division, which will develop the strategic assessment via the 
designed system.  Between September 20 and 23, NPS researchers met with 
ECJ7 assessment personnel, primarily Mr. Bill Hershberger, to gain 
understanding on how they developed strategic assessments.  Based on the 
division’s extensive experience with developing strategic assessments, they are 
also considered SMEs. 
These stakeholders connect efforts at the tactical level to strategic 
objectives and end states, via the assessment process.  Thus, these 
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stakeholders need a system that can collect and store information from the 
tactical level, and offer them access to it, in order to assess the data.  Their work 
must satisfy the desires of the decision makers in the USEUCOM AOR and 
Washington, D.C., in addition to communicating their findings to the planning 
directorate.  This process requires significant time to compile the breadth of 
information into an effective assessment; considering the reporting requirements 
imposed on the assessment directorate. It is possible that quality will be 
sacrificed in order to address the concerns of senior leadership.  They also need 
an end product capable of addressing the unique questions of the varied decision 
makers, without significant rework for each presentation. 
3. System Product Users 
The output of the proposed system is a strategic assessment of the 
current plans in the USEUCOM AOR.  The next group of stakeholders uses this 
product to develop the next iteration of their particular activities. 
 Office of Secretary of Defense  
 ECJ5 Personnel 
 Component Commanders 
 Tactical Commanders 
The mission of these stakeholders differs from each other, so there is no 
unifying trait among them other than an assessment is involved in their activities.  
While there was no direct elicitation with these organizations, the trip to 
USEUCOM provided insight into their relationship to the assessments.  OSD 
conducts reviews of the assessments during In Progress Review (IPR) (U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, I-4).  ECJ5 personnel utilize assessments when 
producing the next iteration of plans.  Component Commanders and tactical 
commanders use given resources to implement the plans, and the quality of 
ECJ5’s plans directly influences their ability to affect the AOR. 
 25
Based on interviews with Mr. Bellchambers and members of ECJ7, 
System Product Users need the given assessment to relate efforts to outcomes, 
in order to influence future plans, and the assessment shall be distributed in a 
timely manner to facilitate incorporating the findings into those plans. 
4. Other 
The last group of stakeholders is not involved with the planning or 
assessment process; however, they are connected to the implementation of all 
USEUCOM activities. 
 State Department  
 U.S. Ambassador 
 Military Personnel in USEUCOM AOR 
The U. S. Ambassador is the DoS representative in a given country and 
works with the particular government to facilitate the methods that Component 
Commands use to perform their given plans, such as a military-to-military 
exercise or a U.S. military operation.  DoS may prevent an exercise from 
occurring, if it is not in the national interest; this conflict would hinder a plan’s 
effectiveness and the assessment would note the conflict.  DoD and DoS would 
then work together to eliminate the conflict. 
Thus, as these stakeholders carry out or facilitate missions at a tactical 
level, they depend on sound plans that will present achievable goals that 
continue to foster U.S. strategic goals. 
4. Effective Need 
The analysis of the system stakeholders illustrates a number of needs 
relating to strategic assessments.  The decision makers require a depth of 
information that connects efforts to outcomes.  The system users must have a 
process that allows them to gather, review and transform data from the tactical 
level into an assessment that describes reality in the AOR.  The system product 
users need access to the assessments in a timely manner to incorporate them 
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into their own products; finally, the assessment needs to improve the COCOM’s 
ability to align the European AOR with strategic goals. 
Combining these needs into a single need statement for the system yields 
the effective need: 
Develop theater-level assessment capability for the purpose of 
evaluating current Phase 0/Steady State activities and operations 
to shape and modify future allocation of resources in order to 
support and advance the interests of the United States with respect 
to the European Theater. 
D. OBJECTIVE HIERARCHY 
The objective hierarchy is a series of characteristics used by the 
stakeholders to measure their satisfaction with the system (Buede 2009, 57).  
These measures include cost and performance criteria and relate to meeting the 




Figure 9.   Objective Hierarchy 
Cost is beyond the scope of this analysis. Therefore, only the performance 
objectives were weighted. These weights do not imply that those objectives are 
refined by refined by































not considered in the functional analysis described in Chapter IV, rather they 
stress that this analysis is focused on the performance of the system.   
The specific performance weights are subjective, as they convey the  
decision maker’s preferences and priorities. Objective 1.1 and 1.2 are the highest 
priority to the stakeholders and crucial to satisfying the effective need.  Appendix 
A discusses the complete objective hierarchy, but the top two objectives are 
explored further below. 
Objective 1.1 identifies the chain of outputs and outcomes of the 
assessment process.  Figure 10 shows how the objective breaks down into 
subordinate objectives.  This break down serves as a checklist to determine 
where to make improvements in the assessment process with respect to 
measuring the effects produced.  Table 2 provides a description of each of the 




Figure 10.   Objective 1.1 Decomposition 
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Table 2.   Description of Objective 1.1’s Sub-Objectives 
Objective 1.2 provides measurement of the strategic assessment content 
quality.  This group of assessment objectives separates the elements that 
describe the feasibility and validity of the assessment.  Figure 11 illustrates the 
decomposition of Objective 1.2, while Table 3 describes the individual objectives. 
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Table 3.   Description of Objective 1.2’s Sub-Objectives 
E. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
There are four categories of requirements to develop for a well-designed 
system, provided in the list below (Buede 2009, 57, 59).  Given the scope of the 
thesis, the development of a functional architecture, the requirements are 
restricted to the first two categories. 
  




















 Input/output requirements: These requirements cover the functional 
requirements, and those involved with system interfaces, inputs 
and outputs. 
 Technology and system-wide requirements: These address 
schedule, cost, technology usage, and suitability of the system. 
 Trade-off requirements: These requirements facilitate trade-off 
analysis. 
 System qualification requirements:  These requirements involve 
testing the system to validate that the produced system conforms to 
the design. 
The requirements defined here are the initial list; as development continues and 
physical components are selected to implement the functional architecture, the 
list will expand. Currently, the requirements are organized into four 
classifications.  Figure 12 illustrates these headings. 
 
 
Figure 12.   System Requirement Classifications 
The stakeholder analysis provided the basis for what the system operation 
will accomplish; primarily, ECJ7 personnel described what they needed from the 
system in order to satisfy USEUCOM Commander, SECDEF and CJCS.  They 
described the information they required to generate the assessment, and who 
would benefit from the assessment beyond the decision makers.  






















The next consideration for requirements was the system interactions, 
illustrated in Figure 8.  These interfaces identify supporting requirements, such 
as communication considerations, that necessitate functions to support the 
assessment development. 
Appendix B presents the complete list of requirements, yet to facilitate the 
development of the functional architecture described in the next chapter, the 









































































Table 5.   Output Requirements 
The foundation of the functional architecture is the complete list of derived 
functions.  In the event that a function is developed and there is no associated 
requirement, the functional analysis uncovered an implied requirement.  The 
utilization of functions to verify requirements following the functional 
decomposition minimizes the risk of ignoring a requirement.  The requirements 
given in Appendix B represent the product of this iterative process. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functions or activities that a system has to perform are a critical 
element for the design process to be successful on a consistent 
basis. 
—Dennis M. Buede (2009, 211) 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Recall the five functions in Buede’s system design: 
1. Defining the Design Problem 
2. Develop Functional Architecture 
3. Design Physical Architecture 
4. Develop Allocated Architecture 
5. Obtain Approval and Document 
The requirements described in Chapter III are the basis for the functional 
architecture. 
Buede describes decomposition as a “top-down structuring” with the top-
level function supported by multiple first-level functions (2009, 218).  These 
functions are broken down into another set of sub-functions.  Next, data and 
items that input or output from the functions or trigger subsequent functions are 
determined. 
Following Buede’s methodology, these functions were presented to other 
engineers and stakeholders in USEUCOM for their consideration (2009, 218).  
This feedback identified missing functions, and suggested alternative functional 
organizations.  Finally, the functions were arranged in a logical order to trace the 
flow of data, as it progresses from the system’s input to its outputs. CORE 8 
University Edition was used to capture the functional architecture.  CORE is a 
systems engineering design tool that utilizes model based system engineering 
concepts to establish traceability throughout the design.  CORE also provides 
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graphical representations of the designed system in order to communicate 
interactions and connections between system elements, specifically, 
requirements, functions and components (Vitech, 2011). 
B. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
The stakeholders’ needs and generated listing of requirements provided 
the initial set of functions.  However, the assessment’s role in the development of 
plans from the strategic to the tactical level presented additional system 
functions.  Figure 8, seen on page 19, illustrated how the various organizations 
interacted; Figure 13 describes the relationship between plans and assessments. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Assessment’s Role in the Planning Process 
Since the GEF is revisited every five years, the time required to complete 
one cycle of the circle exceeds the useful life of a given strategic assessment.  
Thus, the internal arrows of Figure 13 show how an annual assessment affects 



























In addition, Figure 13 alludes to the internal and external assessment 
distribution required for maximum utility of the assessment.  The EUCOM 
Commander and the ECJ5 need to understand all of the effects of the 
implemented plans in order to continue effective missions or modify missions that 
are not supporting the theater end states or goals. 
The top-level function of this system is to “Conduct Theater-Level 
Strategic Assessment.” This function encompasses the entire process, beginning 
with collecting data describing the details from a given mission, tracing that data 
to a particular end state or objective, determining the relative value of that 
mission based on its impact on the AOR, and communicating its findings to 
decision makers.  Imbedded in that communication, the assessors must present 
the risks that the decision maker faces in either the current environment or future 
conditions, within the context of the plans in place. 
Figure 14 illustrates the decomposition of the top-level function into six 
sub-functions.  Recall that an initial desire of the system was to produce an 
assessment that was useful, feasible and repeatable.  The functional process, 
described later in the chapter, addresses the “repeatable” characteristic, while 
the sub-functions address the other two characteristics.  Functions F.1, F.3 and 
F.4 relate to the characteristic, “useful;” these functions provide strategic 
information and traceability between missions and theater objectives to assist 
decision makers in understanding the AOR and selecting follow-on action.  
Function F.2 addresses the term “feasibility;” the accuracy of the assessment is 











































Function F.5 is a result of Figure 13; this function describes the process 
for moving information between the activities and providing the feedback to the 
planning process as shown.  The final function, F.6, is a support function based 
on the technical requirements associated with operating on classified and 
unclassified computer systems. 
This chapter describes the further decomposition of Functions F.1-F.3, 
since they capture the essence of the Strategic Assessment system and provide 
sufficient understanding of the functional architecture to describe the functional 
flow.  The complete functional decomposition, their descriptions and requirement 
basis are given in Appendix C. 
1. Facilitate Decisions that Support U.S. Interests 
This function addresses the external and internal audiences with whom 
the assessment must communicate in order to be successful.  Figure 15 provides 
a graphical representation of the sub-function’s decomposition, while Table 6 
describes each function. 
 
 







































































Table 6.   Function F.1 Description 
Function F.1.1 satisfies the need to present the strategic assessment to 
SECDEF, CJCS and their respective staffs. Current doctrine requires this to 
occur annually.  However, this function is independent of that time restriction in 
order to remain doctrine-neutral and applicable to current and future assessment 
guidance.  The second sub-function is required to transmit the findings internal to 
USEUCOM to promote the modification of theater, regional and country plans to 
improve the effectiveness of operations and missions in the AOR. The third 
function is needed to describe how current operations are affecting the AOR.  
This function would be satisfied when the assessor explains the lack of an impact 
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from a mission.  The final function to facilitate decisions is to present risks to the 
decision makers.  These risks will include the risks associated with maintaining 
the current plan, risks associated with modifying the plan, and possible risks to 
the AOR not addressed by the GEF end states or theater objectives.  The future 
risks would indicate that the end states or objectives require a revision. 
2. Accurately Represent Effects of Operations and Activities 
Function F.2 addresses the quality of the assessment; the function 
describes the acquisition and examination of the input data.  Activities under this 
function would include corroborating the information from other sources, 
assigning a confidence to the data and training assessors to perform their duties.  
Figure 16 decomposes the function and Table 7 describes each function. 
 
 


















































































































Table 7.   Function F.2 Description 
 41
Function F.2.1 encompasses obtaining the source data from a database, 
such as TCSMIS, or some other reporting method.  F.2.2 prompts the assessors 
to use additional sources of information to support or expand on the data.   
“Confidence” as used in F.2.3 considers both the age and completeness 
of the information.  The age is important due to the time sensitive nature of 
assessments.  If the only information available to the assessor is several months 
old, the assessor will still use the data, but the confidence in the relationship 
between that data point and the strategic level may be low.  The completeness of 
the data refers to the assessor’s ability to understand how the data fits into the 
strategic picture.  An example of incomplete data would be a report that “the 
mission was successful.”  In this example, the assessor knows that the mission 
was a success; however, the lack of amplifying information introduces 
uncertainty in the relationship between the mission and the strategic objective.  
When properly implemented, function F.2.3 provides the assessor the ability to 
generate an assessment, while communicating that there is some risk associated 
with conclusions due to uncertainty in the source information. 
Functions F.2.4 and F.2.5 are support functions that enhance ability to 
determine the effects of activities at the tactical level.  F.2.4 requires the 
assessment personnel to be experienced in the AOR.  Given the difficulty in 
relating a narrowly scoped mission to a broad theater strategy, it is imperative the 
assessors possess knowledge of the AOR, in terms of politics, culture, history 
etc.  This knowledge will facilitate understanding how a particular country 
responds to U.S. efforts, and how that country fits into the larger AOR.   
Function F.2.5 is critical to the assessment process in order to ensure that 
assessors learn skills, such as additional techniques of developing metrics for 
measuring progress, risk analysis, and effective methods of presenting data.  
The Combatant Commander will tailor the continuous training program to their 
needs, with the goal of increasing the competency of the assessors and by 
extension, the quality of the assessment. 
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3. Shape Theater Plans 
This function addresses the effect that the strategic assessment has on 
the planning process.  The purpose of the function is to use the generated 
assessment to determine the effectiveness and appropriateness of the plans in 
order to inform decision makers about where changes are needed.  Figure 17 
shows how this function is decomposed into sub-functions, with each description 
















































































Table 8.   Function F.3 Description 
Function F.3.1 and F.3.2 describe the fundamental use of the system 
output; these functions inform the COCOM Commander or decision maker in 
Washington, D.C. about the next step for U.S. forces.  The outcome from these 
functions is critical, since the actions that the COCOM conducted may or may not 
impact the AOR.  However, it is possible that the assessment determines that the 
state of the AOR is aligned with strategic goals independently of the COCOM’s 
activities.  In this case, the plan would require revisions, but not the strategy.   
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F.3.3 addresses the adjustment of resources assigned to the 
implementation of an aspect of the plan.  There are many possible causes for 
this determination.  For example, assume that the assessed cause of a plan not 
producing the desired effect is a lack of resources (limited scope); the 
assessment would recommend that by increasing the resources, the operation’s 
effect on the AOR would increase.  Another possible situation is that a given 
resource allocation shows little to no effect toward achieving the COCOM’s 
goals; the assessment would recommend eliminating the resource expenditure in 
this case. 
F.3.4 and F.3.5 inform the decision makers if the operation at the tactical 
level was conducted in accordance with plan, and whether or not that plan 
supported the higher planning levels.  This information is critical to understanding 
the strategic situation of the AOR.  These functions incorporate the U.S. activities 
with external factors that are beyond the control of the COCOM, to provide the 
decision maker with greater insight into the situation and future risks and 
challenges.  It is possible that sweeping political reforms occur in a given country 
that installs a government that is favorable to U.S. interests; if the assessment 
only informed that decision maker that the AOR was progressing towards its 
goals with respect to this country, the decision maker may infer that COCOM 
activities influenced this result, when this is not true. 
C. FUNCTION TO REQUIREMENT MAPPING 
Following the decomposition of the system functions, Buede discusses the 
need to trace the functions back to the developed list of requirements (2009, 
246).  This is a crucial step to the development of the functional architecture, as it 
verifies that all of the requirements are addressed by a function.  The 
development of the functional decomposition addressed interfaces between 
internal and external components; thus, the act of relating functions to 
requirements can identify new requirements from interface functions, which were 
otherwise unrealized.  
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The mapping of functions to requirements presented here represents the 
iteration of creating functions that were not previously identified, and adding 
requirements that were not captured during the development from the 
stakeholder analysis.  Appendix C provides a complete listing of the basis for 
each function.  However, Table 3 shows the basis for the functions F.0-F.1.4.  
Table 3 also shows that the function-to-requirement is not 1:1, meaning the 
functions satisfy multiple requirements and each requirement supports multiple 

































Table 9.   Function to Requirement Mapping for F.1 
D. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY ACTIVITIES 
Recall Figure 8 that describes the interactions between activities internal 
and external to the system.  For this analysis, ECJ7 is decomposed into the 
ECJ7 Director and the assessors.  The functional analysis also reveals a critical 
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interaction between the system and the COCOM Commander. While the 
Commander is considered outside the system boundaries due to their extensive 
responsibilities beyond assessment, they perform system functions vital to 
satisfying the effective need. 
The first component analyzed is the database that collects information on 
missions and activities from tactical commanders and stores that data for use in 
assessment generation.  Figure 18 illustrates the functions that are assigned to 
this physical component; trade-off analysis determines the specifics of the 
database which leads to additional requirements and possibly more functions.  
However, these are the fundamental functions that the database performs.  Note 
that an “Assessment Request” triggers the “Obtain Source Information and Data.”  
This trigger may be a periodic request determined by doctrine or a specific 
request from a decision maker. This function is performed by the database rather 
than the assessor since at a functional level, the assessor requests the database 
to provide them the data, as opposed the assessor going out to obtain the 
information on their own. The other functions performed included using Internet 
connections to communicate between nodes, i.e., EUCOM Commander and 
ECJ7, display the tactical mission reports, and provide information to the 
assessor that allows for the determination of the age of the report. 
 
































Figure 19 displays the functions the assessor performs while generating 
the strategic assessment. This diagram represents the bulk of the functions 
performed by the system. Thus, the assessor is the crux of the system and if they 
do not have the proper tools or training, the assessment process and quality 
suffers.  These functions represent the tasks required to relate mission effects to 
strategic outcomes.  The two outputs shown represent the complete 
assessments for internal and external review.  The Objective Assessment Report 
informs the COCOM Commander while the Strategic Assessment Report is 
presented to decision makers in Washington, D.C. 
 
Figure 19.   Functions Performed by Assessor Component 
The next component examined is the ECJ7 Director; Figure 20 presents 
the functions performed by this component.  This component receives the 
assessment from the assessors and interfaces with the ECJ5 Director and 
COCOM Commander. He also performs the support functions for the directorate, 
such as instituting a training program for the assessors and ensuring that the 













































































Figure 20.   Functions Performed by ECJ7 Component 
The final component present here is the COCOM Commander.  This is a 
unique component, as it is both a decision maker and performs system functions.  
During the internal assessment process the Commander is the decision maker, 
yet when the strategic assessment is presented to decision makers in 
Washington, the Commander presents the information to CJCS and SECDEF.  
The Commander uses the strategic assessment as part of a dialogue to 
communicate the environment and conditions in their AOR in order to shape the 



























Figure 21.   Functions Performed by EUCOM Commander Component 
E. FUNCTIONAL PROCESS MODEL 
In addition to the function decomposition, a functional architecture process 
model is used to trace how data is moved from input to output and then to 
outcomes.  Buede describes this as transforming the “black box” model, shown in 
Figure 7, into a “white box” model that illustrates what functions are used (2009 
216). 
CORE was used to develop Figures 22–28; each white block represents a 
function from the functional hierarchy.  The number at the top is the function 
number, the function name is in the middle, and the component that performs the 
function is shown at the bottom.  Grey bubbles represent items that are inputs to 
or outputs from the function and greens bubbles indicate items that trigger a 
given function.  Triggers also use a double arrow to show what function is 
triggered. 
First, the functional process model (Figure 22) shows that there are five 
functional processes that are used during system operation.  These processes 
are Technical Support, Personnel Training and Support, Assessment 




























Presentation.  Technical Support and Personnel Training and Support are 
continuous processes, as indicated by the loop graphic in the figure, which 
support the overall assessment process.  The middle path describes the strategic 
assessment process that begins with an assessment request; currently this 
request is in the form of a requirement imposed on the COCOMs (U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011a, II-6).  However, the request is not limited to that method.  
At the conclusion of the Assessment Development process, a Final Strategic 
Assessment is generated, which triggers the final two functional processes.  The 
output of the model indicates that the decisions reached at the end of the 
process feedback into the planning process shown in Figure 13 as applicable 
and the output of the system produces the desired outcome that U.S. interests 
are furthered in the USEUCOM AOR. 
 
Figure 22.   Overall Function Flow Block Diagram 
Figure 23 presents the first support functional process.  This continuous 
process begins with determining the technical architecture for the system.  This 
includes selection of hardware, software and determining the methods for 
connecting the access points to the system.  Next, the individuals and 




























include tactical commanders, Component Commands, COCOMs, etc.  Then, a 
connection to a network will be established to allow information to be entered into 
the database and remote access to information on the database.  The system will 
allow the user to define criteria to sort through the information on the database, 
such as keyword searches.  In addition, the database will allow the users to 
assign a value or weight to the information based on the value system selected 
later.  Finally, the system will use a loop that monitors the systems connectivity 



















































The next functional process involves the staffing requirement for the 
system, presented in Figure 24.  The system relies on qualified individuals being 
selected as assessors, and then training them on the methods and goals of 
strategic assessments.  The training program will also provide the assessors with 
sufficient understanding of USEUCOM’s AOR in order to make conclusions 
about the environment, and establish linkages between USEUCOM efforts and 
strategic objectives and end states. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Personnel Training and Development 
Figures 25 and 26 capture the functional process that begins with a 
request for a strategic assessment and ends with the finalization of the 
assessment.  The first part of the process is the determination that an 
assessment is required; currently doctrine establishes this to be completed 
annually.  This produces a request to trigger the assessment development.  
Tactical commanders submit reports to the system database upon completion of 
their mission or periodically if the mission is still in progress. 
Based on the trigger, the assessor will access the database to obtain the 
mission reports and classify them as source information that comprise the LOA 
reports and form the basis for the strategic assessment.  The assessor 
segregates the source data into qualitative and quantitative information to 
facilitate conclusions later in the process.  Next, the assessor will obtain 
supporting information from sources such as intelligence reports or news stories 




























































Figure 26 continues the process by determining the confidence level for 
the source information based on a combination of the data’s completeness and 
age.  The assessor will determine the completeness of the source information to 
identify if additional information is required from the tactical commander.  
Missions still in progress may present challenges to the assessor as the 
information is not complete.  In this case, the assessor may have to utilize his or 
her expertise more than during a situation where the source data provides the 
assessor with a great deal of detail.  Then the assessor will identify the age of the 
data; mission reports submissions do not necessarily match the assessment time 
lines, so there exists the possibility that a given report is months old, and the 
situation may be different than the report indicates.  The output of Function 
F.2.3.1 and F.2.3.2 produce a confidence level used later in the process.  The 
next set of functions occurs in parallel and relate to the purpose of the 
assessment.  The assessor will determine if the mission was successfully 
completed, establish the linkage between the mission and the theater objectives, 
and then relate the theater objectives to the desired end states.   
Once the assessor understands the impact of missions on the state of the 
AOR, the assessor will review prior assessments to establish trends.  Given the 
trend analysis and confidence level of the source information from earlier steps, 
the assessor can put current COCOM efforts into a historical context in order to 
demonstrate progress made since the previous assessment and generate the 
Strategic Assessment Report for external distribution and the Objective 




























































The internal assessment process, illustrated in Figure 27, is triggered by 
the Objective Assessment report and involves presenting a strategic theater 
assessment to the COCOM Commander.  This process begins by sharing the 
findings with ECJ5 for their use in plan development; the ECJ7 and ECJ5 
interaction is critical to maximizing the utility of the assessment and improving the 
effectiveness of USEUCOM’s plans.   
The findings of the assessment are presented to the COCOM Commander 
in a format deemed appropriate by USEUCOM.  Possible methods include 
PowerPoint presentations or interactive “dashboard” displays that can vary the 
data in real-time to observe the predicted effects.  The purpose of the 
presentation is to communicate the traceability between USEUCOM’s efforts and 
the plans at the country, region and theater level and relate them to the GEF end 
states.  This is accomplished by demonstrating the impact of current activities on 
the AOR, presenting risks to the AOR and making recommendation for changes 
in the way USEUCOM allocates its resources, changes in the plans at any level 
and validating that the plans support the theater objectives and end states.  This 
process ends with the COCOM Commander deciding the appropriate action 
based on the findings. 
The external assessment process, shown in Figure 28 is similar to the 
internal process, except that the COCOM Commander approves the presentation 
prior to its distribution and the presentation makes recommendations to the 
leadership in Washington on the same issues as the internal presentation, with 



































































































































F. PROPOSED ASSESSMENT PROCESS ARCHITECTURE 
Given the functional architecture developed and described in the 
functional process, a proposed assessment process architecture is given in 
Figure 29.  This architecture is juxtaposed with the planning process shown in 
Figure 5; there is a clear connection between planning and assessment, so it 
follows that the process architectures would be similar.  Another advantage to 
this architecture is that the linkage between the mission and the theater goal is 
established in steps.  Under this structure, a level is supported by the one below 
it so the assessor has to show that a mission supports a country plan, a country 
plan supports a regional plan, a regional plan supports a theater objective, and 
that objective supports an end state, so by extension, the mission supports the 
given end state.   
This process is simpler to address than attempting to directly to connect a 
given effort to a strategic end state.  In the event that a particular mission failed 
to support an end state, the assessment would inform the decision maker where 
the breakdown occurred.  For example a mission may support a country plan but 
the country plan does not support a regional plan.  In this case the assessor may 
still be able to establish a linkage between a mission and an end state, yet the 
assessment revealed a disconnect between two plans that requires ECJ5 to re-
evaluate the given plan. 
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V. APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
We must find ways to operate government more efficiently and at a 
lower cost to taxpayers. 
—Senator John McCain (U.S. Congress 2011, 13) 
A. APPLICATION RATIONALE 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the developed model, it needs to be 
tested against a hypothetical scenario.  The scenario includes a given set of 
plans at the levels of abstraction described in Chapter I and a notional set of 
USEUCOM operations: one conducted in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) member country and the other conducted in a non-NATO member 
country.  To avoid clearance issues, both the plans and scenarios are fictional 
and do not represent current USEUCOM plans.  The purpose of this examination 
is to provide an example of what occurs during the assessment process model to 
demonstrate its utility. 
B. NOTIONAL PLAN 
The notional plan represents the entire planning process from the GEF 
end states down to the country plan.  For ease of development, USEUCOM is 
divided into 2 regions: developed and developing nations.  This is not the method 
USEUCOM uses, but it is convenient for the purposes of this thesis.  Recalling 
Figure 5, the notional plan provides greater specificity as it moves from the 
strategic to tactical level.  The plan also demonstrates that the lower levels 
support the level above it, as, for instance, Theater Objectives 2 and 3 support 
the first end state.  This relationship is integral to the assessment process, as it 
develops the linkage between operations conducted in a country and the desired 
end state. 




1. Stable and Secure Europe 
2. Strong NATO, Capable of Conducting Out-of-Area Operations 
Theater Objectives 
1. Support Regional Stability 
2. Support efforts to counter transnational threats 
3. Promote NATO Interoperability and Active Support of NATO 
Operations 
4. Encourage Participation in Regional Security Alliances 
Regional Plan 
1. Developed Nations 
a. Foster Military-to-Military Relationship 
b. Build Support for Participation in NATO Operations 
c. Build Information Sharing Agreements 
2. Developing Nations 
a. Assist National Military Development 
b. Facilitate NATO interactions 
c. Support Defense Reform 
Country Blue Plan 
1. Cooperate to Counter Support to Violent Extremist Organizations 
(VEO) 
2. Support NATO Peace Keeping Operations 
Country Green Plan 
1. Develop military capabilities 
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2. Enhance country’s international presence 
3. Support country’s defense against threats from Country Orange 
C. NOTIONAL SCENARIO 
The fictional scenario involves an exercise off the coast of Country Green, 
a hypothetical non-NATO country in the USEUCOM AOR.  The exercise is two 
weeks in duration, with the naval forces comprised of U.S. and Country Blue, a 
fictional NATO nation, assets and Green land forces.  The event is conducted 
following the completion of an U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) training program 
with Green’s Army. 
The premise of the exercise, led by USAREUR is that a VEO is 
threatening to overthrow Country Green’s elected government and NATO has 
been asked to provide support to Green’s forces without putting NATO forces on 
Green’s soil.  Green has authorized NATO forces to use their airspace and enter 
their territorial waters.   
At the end of the exercise, USAREUR submits a report that NATO forces 
conducted 50 strike missions, discovered a cache of small arms during an 
unopposed boarding and provided Green forces reconnaissance on VEO 
movements outside the capital city.  The report also stated that Green forces, 
acting on NATO intelligence, attacked the VEO leadership compound.  The 
attack demonstrated small unit, urban tactics and coordination between land and 
naval units.  In the Commander’s Comments section, it is stated, “U.S. and Blue 
forces operated in accordance with NATO procedure, and executed strikes 
against VEO targets in a timely fashion.  Green forces demonstrated increased 
proficiency from previous operations and were capable of disrupting rebel forces 
within their country.  Coalition forces experienced significant challenges 
communicating and coordinating movement with Green units.” 
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D. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
1. Data Processing 
Given there is an assessment request to trigger the assessment process 
shown in Figure 25, the USAREUR report is sent to the assessment database.  
The assessor separates the data into two categories: the number of strikes, 
number of weapons recovered, number of Green troops used to attack the VEO 
compound, and the items recovered from the compound are considered 
quantitative evidence, and the Commander’s Comments are classified qualitative 
evidence.   
Media reports and press releases from Green’s military leadership 
supported the quantitative evidence.  Conversations with members of the 
embassy staff from both countries indicated satisfaction with the exercise and 
agreed with the Commander’s findings.  The assessor then determines that the 
USAREUR report is two months old and all the required fields of the report were 
completed.  Based on the report and corroborating information, the assessor 
assigns a high confidence to the report and findings.  The completion of this step 
satisfies the functions in Figure 26 up to Function 2.3.2. 
2. Relating Data to the Plan 
The determination of linkages between the levels of abstraction utilizes the 
three parallel functions presented in Figure 26 and highlighted in Figure 30. 
 67
 
Figure 30.   Functions That Establish Linkage Between Mission and End State 
The assessor will use F.3.4 to determine if the mission achieved the goals as set 
forth prior to the mission.  F.4.4 is achieved when the assessor describes the 
linkages through a series of intermediate steps: how the mission supports the 
given country plan, how the country plan supports the regional plan and how the 
regional plan supports the theater objective.  The final function in Figure 30, 
F.4.5, is achieved when the connections to the end states are established by 
identifying how the theater objectives are promote the end state. 
Thus, the assessor reviews the mission plans and determines that they 
were successful, satisfying F.3.4.  The assessor determines that the exercise 
supports Country Blue Plan 1 and Country Green Plan 1.  Subsequently, the 
assessor establishes the linkage to the next level of abstractions.  Country Blue 
Plan 1 supports Regional Plan 1.a and 1.b; Country Green Plan 1 supports 
Regional Plan 2.a and 2.b.  Following, the assessor links Regional Plan 1.a to 
Theater Objective 4, Regional Plan 1.b to Theater Objective 3, Regional Plan 2.a 
to Theater Objective 1 and Regional Plan 2.b to Theater Objective 3.  This series 
























Objective 1 and 4 to End State 1 and Objective 3 to End State 2, fulfilling F.4.5.  
Figure 30 illustrates how the missions support End State 1. 
 
Figure 31.   Linkage between End State 1 and the Notional NATO Mission 
After the linkage between the event and the theater’s end states, the 
assessor reviews previous assessments related to the end states and theater 
objectives to determine trends on USEUCOM’s progress toward achieving the 
strategic goals.  Trend analysis is also necessary at the regional and country 
level to determine how efforts over time are affecting the lower levels of the 
planning structure.  This lower level trend analysis will likely not occur in 
conjunction with the strategic assessment; it is recommended that these trends 
be determined earlier, in order to provide additional context for the strategic 
assessment. 
After the assessor incorporates the trend analysis, they can format the 
assessment as appropriate for internal and external transmission.  The functional 
process breaks the follow-on actions into parallel branches, since the internal 
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report is not necessarily the foundation for the external report, nor does the 
internal report always require a follow-on report be generated, if the purpose of 
the given assessment is for USEUCOM use. However, in general the internal 
process will occur and following approval, the assessment will be sent outside of 
USEUCOM. 
3. Presenting the Assessment 
At this point the assessment has progressed through the functions shown 
in Figures 25 and 26 on page 55 and 57 respectively, and the strategic 
assessment has included data from the described exercise and all other activities 
in the AOR during the assessment period.  The aggregation of the information is 
formatted into the Strategic and Objective Assessment Reports.  These reports 
trigger the next set of functional processes described in Figures 27 and 28 on 
page 59 and 60 respectively. For the internal process, the report is provided to 
the planning directorate for them to review and incorporate into the next revision 
of the plans.  It is critical that the planning directorate receive the assessment 
early in the planning timeline, to maximize the assessment’s impact on 
USEUCOM’s plans; this requires the assessment and planning timelines to be 
synchronized within the COCOM.   
Over the course of several meetings of working groups, the report is used 
to describe the findings of the assessment, traceability between tactical and 
strategic levels, and risks to address in the future.  These groups provide 
recommendations to the COCOM Commander concerning changes in plans and 
resource allocation.  The Commander then decides the appropriate course of 
action and provides direction to USEUCOM’s directorates.  The strategic 
assessment report progresses through a similar process, although the decisions 
made based on the assessment reflect a global strategic point of view, rather 
than a theater strategic view.  Thus, SECDEF makes decisions about U.S. 
strategy and instead of resource allocation within a theater, there are 
considerations about how to allot resources among all the COCOMs. 
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4. Making Decisions 
For simplicity, there is an assumption that the notional exercise was the 
first of its kind with the two countries, so there is little historical evidence to 
establish trends.  In addition, all other aspects of the assessment are ignored, so 
the decisions will be solely based on the single exercise. 
The assessment process demonstrated the connection between the 
exercise and the theater’s desired end state, by establishing links between one 
level and the level directly above it.  Since the exercise illustrated deficiencies in 
coordination between NATO and Country Green, the assessment indicates that 
future iterations of the exercise, and possibly conducting further training with 
Green’s Army, supports the theater end states and U.S. strategy.  As such, the 
exercise provides value to the AOR, and is an effective use of USEUCOM’s 
resources.  Assuming appropriate metrics are used to quantify the utility of the 
exercise, it would then be possible to measure the utility of the exercise against 
other activities conducted in the AOR.  Figure 32 displays how the three groups 
discussed in the previous sections use the strategic assessment to improve the 
COCOM’s ability to develop and implement plans that support U.S. interests, 
building of Figure 13, which describes the assessment’s role in the planning 




Figure 32.   Assessment’s Utilization by Decision Makers and Planners 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL’S APPLICATION 
All of the COCOMs, and EUCOM in particular, are currently conducting 
assessments in their AOR, so they are able to relate events conducted at the 
tactical level to strategic end states.  This demonstration of the assessment 
process is useful to establish a framework for establishing the traceability 
between the levels of abstraction.  The described model provides a defined high-
level process that provides COCOMs flexibility in the implementation and 
communicates to decision makers the impact of activities in an AOR, without an 
explicit linkage between an activity and effects observed in a given country. 
This simplistic example describes how the system’s functions 
chronologically over time to facilitate and provide context to strategic decisions.  
This application did not combine all of the activities conducted in the AOR, since 
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the purpose to use the notional scenario to frame the functional model in the 
context of a practical exercise.  The above example describes the process from 
which hundreds of data points can be combined into tens of items that express 
the strategic reality of the AOR, and thus making the assessor’s task of relating 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States and Europe are inextricably linked-politically as 
allies and partners in diplomacy. 
—Admiral James G. Stavirdis (U.S. Congress 2011, 1) 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the functional architecture developed in this thesis, the research 
questions posed earlier can be answered. 
1. What Are The Critical Functions That A Strategic Theater Level 
Assessment Must Perform To Support Decision Makers?  
The process of the functional decomposition, detailed in this thesis, 
answered the first question and can be summarized by five critical functions for a 
strategic assessment system: 
1. Facilitate Decisions that Support American Interests 
2. Accurately Represent Effects of Operations and Activities 
3. Shape Theater Plans 
4. Provide Evidence to Justify Resource Expenditures 
5. Communicate Strategic Information 
2. How Are The Terms “Useful, Feasible And Repeatable” 
Defined Within The Context Of Strategic Assessment?  
This thesis concluded that a strategic assessment is a useful product 
when it facilitates future decisions by informing leadership about how missions 
conducted in the AOR do or do not support the strategic end states.  If an 
assessment cannot describe the linkages between tactical and strategic levels of 
abstraction, it will not provide the greatest possible utility to decision makers. 
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Feasibility, the second characteristic, is realized when the effects of given 
activities are realized and accurate.  This characteristic is achieved through a 
series of data verifications and the expertise of the assessors.   
The final characteristic, repeatability, is necessary to the assessment 
process to ensure that it has sufficient flexibility to be valid for any administration 
or set of goals, while producing consistent desired results.  In this case, a 
process is repeatable if it satisfies the functions defined earlier.  The means by 
which these functions are implemented will change as new assessment 
techniques and technologies are developed, however the developed functional 
process will be repeatable over time. 
3. How Does The Assessment Process Transform Inputs Into 
Outputs?  
The assessment system receives reports from tactical commanders that 
describe the events of a given mission.  The assessor transforms these inputs in 
a strategic context by validating that data, identifying trends and determining 
relationship between a given level of abstraction and the level immediately above 
it until the assessor has reached the strategic end states. 
4. How Does The Assessment Relate Activities Conducted In The 
AOR To Strategic End States?  
While this thesis did not specifically define the actions that COCOMs must 
take to relate tactical events to strategic end states, it shows that the relationship 
between these levels of abstraction can be determined through a series of 
intermediate connections.  Since only a single level separates the items being 
connected, the relationship between them is easier to determine than relating a 
mission directly to a strategic goal. 
5. Conclusion 
 Strategic assessments are the primary vehicle for COCOMs to 
communicate how their efforts support U.S. strategy and areas that require 
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additional time and or resources to achieve success.  Therefore, the assessment 
process requires a definition that is flexible enough to be applicable regardless of 
U.S. strategy yet still provides sufficient detail that when implemented, addresses 
the concerns of the stakeholders, specifically, SECDEF and CJCS.  The 
foundation of such a process is the functional architecture provided by this thesis. 
B. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis develops a functional architecture for conducting strategic 
assessments in the USEUCOM AOR utilizing Vitech’s CORE 8 University 
Edition, according to the systems engineering process described by Dennis 
Buede.  Requirements and objectives derived from a stakeholder analysis and 
communication with ECJ7 provides the basis for this architecture.  From the 
architecture, a functional process model details high level functions that activate 
during the creation and presentation of strategic assessments. 
Strategic assessments inform senior leadership of the impact of activities 
conducted in the AOR and describe risks facing the AOR in order to facilitate 
decisions that can shape the area according to national strategy.  Joint 
Publications 3-0 and 5-0 provide guidance for conducting and developing these 
assessments, yet the particular expectations are ambiguous and vary among the 
different audiences.   
Given budget realities facing the U.S. Government and specifically DoD, it 
is crucial to minimize unnecessary work and resource expenditures.  To this aim, 
this thesis defines the individuals and organizations connected to the 
assessment process, thereby capturing the various needs and perspectives of 
the system users.  Understanding the spectrum of users ensures that the system 
outputs better align with the set of needs the system is addressing than if 
consideration was only given to the immediate problems the system is desired to 
correct. Thus, thorough stakeholder analysis promotes efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
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Stakeholder analysis led to the development of system requirements that 
informs all stakeholders about the purpose of the system.  This derivation is 
necessary to prevent an organization from expecting unrealistic outputs from the 
assessment.  In addition, the requirements inform organizations about the 
relationship between the inputs and the ability to produce quality assessments.  
From an engineering perspective, this step ensures that a complete set of 
functions is created to satisfy all requirements. 
The created functional architecture establishes the framework for 
conducting assessment.  This framework defines what the system will 
accomplish and provides a process that describes when functions activate over 
time.  Decomposing the core functions into sub-functions establish a hierarchy 
for the system.  Next, these functions are assigned to the physical entities that 
perform the given function and arranged into a process as a function of time; the 
combination of the hierarchy and process defines the functional architecture for 
the strategic assessment system.  The functional process demonstrates the 
order of functions that transform inputs from tactical commanders into an 
assessment of the AOR that serves as the basis for decision makers and 
planners to develop strategies that facilitate outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. 
The application of the functional timeline describes that events at the 
tactical level do not have to be connected directly to a strategic goal.  In fact this 
is not desired, as it is difficult to accomplish, and it is possible to dilute or inflate 
the impact of an activity on the AOR.  By establishing the relationships through a 
series of incremental and clearly annotated steps, the assessment demonstrates 
areas that require additional attention, or a common fault that is impeding a 
range of activities from achieving their goals that could have been otherwise 
unobserved. 
Beyond defining what the system accomplishes, this thesis illustrates the 
interactions between assessments and other systems and processes such as 
planning and resource allocation.  By considering the integration of assessment 
into a larger system, concepts such as synchronization with plan development, 
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which may have otherwise been overlooked, are shown to be critical to the utility 
of assessments.  Failure to account for these integration points creates situations 
that can marginalize the assessment’s effect on the AOR and national interests. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Since this thesis develops the assessment framework by accomplishing 
the early stages of the system engineering process, there are numerous follow-
on research opportunities. 
1. Metric Development 
The assessor must identify quantitative and qualitative evidence; implicit in 
that requirement is the measurement of that information.  Examples of 
measurement can be money spent on the activity, time spent on the activity and 
public polling before and after the activity.  Value functions can be developed to 
quantify these measurements in terms of their utility. 
2. Data Aggregation 
There are many possible choices for aggregating the information from the 
tactical level up to the strategic level.  The challenge is preventing selective 
information from driving the strategic summary to an “average” value that has lost 
meaning and requires investigation to determine the information critical to the 
AOR’s strategic environment. 
A research trip to USSOUTHCOM in March 2012, revealed that an 
assessment represents the completion of strategic objectives for each country as 
a percentage.  This method weights each objective equally; therefore, it is 
interesting to explore how to weight the strategic objectives.  Across the AOR, 
they might be equally valuable; however, a given objective may not be applicable 
to a particular country, so the assessment must account for the varied application 
of the objectives across the AOR.  Accordingly, a research topic of interest is 
how to present the assessment in a concise way that begins at the strategic level 
and becomes more detailed, as the level of abstraction is reduced.  For example, 
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this could aggregate the countries across the AOR, removing the extremely 
stable and unstable countries as outliers beyond the COCOM’s immediate 
influence. 
3. Graphical Presentation of Assessment 
By considering the decision making process and its dependency on the 
way information is received, a potential research topic examines the data that 
needs to be presented, and how the orientation of that information can be used 
to maximize the comprehension of the presentation by the decision maker under 
the time-constrained environments of senior leadership. 
A well-designed graphical dashboard that presents strategic information 
and offers the ability to forecast the effect of events on the overall AOR would be 
a valuable tool for decision makers.  Such a tool could indicate that it would 
require significant allocation of resources to affect change, where those same 
resources, spread over multiple countries, could affect change over a wider 
geographic space. 
4. Functional Model Validation 
Leveraging a battle space simulation program, such as Joint Theater 
Level Simulation, to build a scenario with defined units from the various country 
participants.  This simulation can produce quantitative data for comparison 
against metrics that represent a given COCOMs goals.  Such an examination 
facilitates a validation of the functional architecture beyond the notional example 
in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A.  OBJECTIVE HIERARCHY 
This appendix details the full objective hierarchy, both in visual 
decompositions and tables describing the objectives. 
 
Figure 33.   Objective O.1 Decomposition 
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Figure 34.   Objective O.1.1 Decomposition 
refined by refined by refined by refined by
refined by refined by




















































































Figure 35.   Objective O.1.2 Decomposition  
 































































Table 12.   Objective O.1.3-1.3.3 Descriptions























Figure 37.   Objective O.1.4 Decomposition 
 
 
refined by refined by refined by refined by












































Table 13.   Objective O.1.4-1.4.4 Descriptions 
 
Figure 38.   Objective O.2.1 Decomposition 
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Table 14.   Objective O.2-2.1.4 Descriptions 
 
Figure 39.   Objective O.2.2 Decomposition 
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APPENDIX B.  SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
This appendix provides a complete list of the requirements and their 






































































Table 19.   Technical Requirements 
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APPENDIX C.  FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The complete functional decomposition is provided in this appendix in 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 31.   Function to Requirement F.6 
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